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Whether or not "the foundations and the practice of statistics are in turmoil",1 it is wise to 
question methods whose misuse has been lamented for over a century.2-4 Perhaps the most 
widespread misuse of statistics is taking the crossing of some threshold as license for 
declaring "statistical significance" and for generalizing from a single study. Such generalized 
conclusions are often taken up by science communicators, media and political stakeholders 
without recognition of their uncertainty. A major consequence is flip-flopping headlines such 
as "chocolate is good for you" followed by "chocolate is bad for you".5 No wonder, only 
about a third of over 2000 respondents in a survey on the British public said they would trust 
data from medical trials.6 
 
Often, it is better to simply describe observed associations and their uncertainties (eg by 
giving point and interval estimates and plotting raw data). If inference to some target 
population is required, it typically suffices to suggest a range of values that are highly 
compatible with the data and modelling assumptions—for example, by explicitly interpreting 
both endpoints of interval estimates and noting that such intervals likely understate the 
degree of uncertainty.7 
 
A call to describe observed associations does not grant a "free pass" to report results from 
single studies as revealing some general truth. Instead, it encourages honest description of 
all results and humility about conclusions, thereby reducing selection and publication biases. 
The aim of single studies should be to report uncensored information that can later be used 
to make more general conclusions based on cumulative evidence from multiple studies. 
 
In contrast to Ioannidis,8 we and others9-15 hold that it is using—not retiring—statistical 
significance as a "filtering process" or "gatekeeper"16 that "gives bias a free pass".8 As has 
been known for decades, statistically significant estimates are biased away from the null and 
statistically nonsignificant estimates are biased towards the null. Therefore, any discussion 
that focuses on estimates chosen for their statistical significance or nonsignificance will be 
biased. 
 
Not only does statistical (non)significance introduce bias, but also it fails to address various 
biases that can afflict studies. As any survey research textbook will confirm, those who 
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choose to respond to a survey typically differ from those who choose not to—whether, for 
example, the British survey respondents6 discussed above or those of Hardwicke and 
Ioannidis.17 Raw results from such surveys are biased and can mislead about the target 
population. Statistical significance cannot detect or adjust for those or other biases and thus 
relying on it gives bias a free pass. 
 
The biases produced by selecting results for their statistical significance or nonsignificance 
arise at all steps in scientific research, including decisions about what to include in models, 
discuss in papers, accept for publication and emphasize in editorials, reviews and popular 
reports. Such biases arise not only from the use of P-value thresholds but also from the use 
of Bayes factor (or any other) thresholds, as well as from focusing on whether or not interval 
estimates include some null value. 
 
Statistics from single studies are often better reported as compact summaries of relations in 
the data, not as inferences about some (often ill-defined) target population—in other words, 
inferential statistics should be treated as descriptive statistics.13 Authors should write 
sentences like "we found a risk ratio of 1.20 (95% CI: [0.80, 1.80]; P = .38)" without being 
criticized for overstating the evidence—as long as they do not claim general conclusions; and 
they should be criticized for misrepresenting their results, for example, as "our study shows 
there is an increased risk" or "our study shows there is no association".7 
 
We also disagree that "abandoning the concept of statistical significance would make claims 
of 'irreproducibility' difficult if not impossible to make".17 In reality, it is difficult if not 
impossible to make claims of 'irreproducibility' based on statistical significance vs 
nonsignificance. For example, Ioannidis and Lau18 summarized 32 studies on antibiotic 
prophylaxis in colon surgery. Although only about half the studies attained statistical 
significance, this does not mean the effect was irreproducible: the cumulative evidence 
across the 32 studies strongly suggested that antibiotic prophylaxis was effective. This is one 
of many examples of meta-analysis illustrating a key point of the excellent paper by 
Goodman, Fanelli and Ioannidis,19 who noted that after an initial statistically significant 
result, "the failure to observe a significant result in a second experiment of similar design is 
to be expected and cannot be used as a criterion to undermine the credibility of the first 
experiment," and that "a preferred way to assess the evidential meaning of two or more 
results with substantive stochastic variability is to evaluate the cumulative evidence they 
provide vis-á-vis a hypothesis of interest and not whether one contradicts or discredits the 
other through the lens of statistical significance". 
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